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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES JOSEPH, TAMARA LEE
JOSEPH, and :MELANIE JOSEPH)
by Their Guardian ad litem,
CHARLES JOSEPH,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
W. H. GROVES LATTER . . DAY
SAINTS HOSPITAL~ a corporation,
De/en_dant and Respondent.

Case No .
9068

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATE:MENT OF FACTS
In general the respondent agrees with the very
sketchy statement of facts contained in appellants"' brief.
However:- respondent deems it necessary to elaborate on
appellants"' statement and cannot agree with it in its
entirety.
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For instance, respondent cannot agree that soon after
the. second pint o.f .blood was started :Mrs. Joseph began
sweating and chilling. The· only reliable evidence ~ the
record· controverts this claim. The testimony of respondent"s nurses is very strongly to the effect that no noticeable
sweating or chilling occurred. Rosemary Meyer Miller~
a registered nurse in attendance upon Mrs. Joseph, testified positively to this eff cc t and further that she observed
this p a ticn t personally on several occasions during the
trans fusion and saw no evidence of sweating or chilling.
(Tr. 202-206.)
·
·
T 0 the Saine effect was the testimony of Hedy r.
Davis, a practical nurse likewise personally in attendance
'upon Mrs. Joseph on ·the day of this blood transfusion.
(Tr. 229-232.)

Apparently the jury believed this testimony became
it returned a speci_al verdict that there was nothing in
Mrs. Joseph~s condition .during the time when the second
transfusion was being given to in die ate that she was having
a transfusion reaction (T r. 2 81 ) •
The qnly testimo9y supporting the· statement in appellants"' brief was given by the plaintiff himself.

On the question of what caused the lower· nephron
nephrosis; which w~ ·the cause of death} it is conceded that
the medical experts all testi£ed ·tha. t its probable or most
l~ely cau~ was. a he.molytic transfusion reaction4 How~ver, they all agreed that lower nephron nephrosis has many
·causes and · tha. t it was not impnssi ble that .1 ts cause in thjs
case could have been from something besides a transfusion
reaction.
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Illustrative of this evidence is the testimony of Dr.
Wintrobe (Tr. 164).

This may be unimportant in this case because the
case was submitted by the trial court to the jury upon the
appellants' theory that a transfusion reaction did in fact
occur. (Ins t. No. 10 ~ R. 321.)
Inasmuch as appellants make much of the contention in their argument that in processing the blood used
for the transfusion a mix-up could have occurred,. respondent deems it of great importance to include in this
statement references to the procedures followed in the
de£ end ant hospital in the selection and preparation of
blood for transfusions. This evidence is uncontroverted.

The steps are as follows:
1.. A donor presents himself at the blood bank and
fills out a card which contains information necessary to a
determination of his fi. tness to donate blood.
A registered nur.se draws the blood directly from
the donor into a bottle of 500 ccs. capacity.
2.

When the bottle i_s full, the nurse fills three pilot
tubes, also directly from the donor.
3.

4t She then attaches identically printed numbered
gummed labels to the donor card, the bottle and pilot tubes
containing the donor's blood.
5. When the process of drawing the blood· and numbering .is complete, the nur.se then attaches one numbered
pilot tube to the identically numbered transfusion bottle
and this is then placed in a refrigerator. The other two
identically numbered pilot tubes are taken to the laboraSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tory where, the blood is tested for type and Rh factor and
other necessary information, after which these two pilot
tubes are placed in the refrigerator with the transfusion
bottle and the third pilot tube . All of these tubes and the
bottle are attached to each other by masking tape and remain in the refrigerator until the blood is either used or
discarded. The entire donor procedure is handled by the
same nurse.. ( T r. 18 5, 18 6, 24 2~ 2 4 6 t Ex. P4, D 5 & D 6) .

When the hospital blood bank is called upon to furnish blood for a transfusiont the following procedure occurs:
1.. The patient,s blood is typed from a direct sample
taken by a technician.
2. Blood of the same type and Rh factor contained
in the pilot tubes is then taken from the stored blood in
the refrigerator, which, as above pointed out, has already
been typed and labelled.
3. The patient~s blood and the donor"s blood is then
matched and cross-matched to determine compatibility.
4. If the tests made indicate compa tibj}ity ~ the blood
is then sent to the operating room or the patient~s hospital
room, where a doc tor starts the actual transfusion process .
(Tr. 247-249 . )

There is not even a shred of evidence that this proced u re failed at any point in this case so that Mrs. Joseph
was given blood which was improperly typed or mismatched with her own.

An_other 1mpor tant and vital paint involved in this
case, which appellants rna ke only slight and passing reference to, is that these tests are not infalliblet Despite the
most meticulous care there is inherent in every blood
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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transfusion a risk that approved and recognized testing
of blood will not reveal latent incompatibility which cannot be d~tected or avoided. Thus:~ from 1/10 to 5/10 of
I% of transfusions will inevitably resu It in hemolytic react ion and a bout 40% of these accidents will cause death.

To t h[s effect testified every ex pert who was called
to the witness stand~ in-cluding Dr. Wintrobc and Drt
Crockett4 (Tr . 112- I 14; I 1.5;

154~56;

165.)

Both Dr . Crockett and Dr. Wintrobe, both of whom
were c ailed by appellants~ positively tcsti6 ed they could
find no evidence upon which they could base an opin.io11
that Mrs. Joseph had been given the ~Trong blood~ or that
this blood had been improperly selected or processed. (Tr ..
112 ~ 164-16 5~ 170-71.) Furthermore there is not one
iota of evidence of any mixup occurring which appellants
urge in jus ti:fic ation of a reversal.
Also, the only symptoms of incompatible blood
claimed by appellants and testi£cd to by plain tiff himself
was that his wife at sorne indefinite time during the trailsfusion of the second pint of blood, began to sweat pro~
fusely and have chills. The other symptoms of a transfusion reaction were entirely absent and those claimed by
plaintiff were controverted by defendant's nurses. (Tr. 99~
115} 116. )
Further, some sweating and chilling is to be expected
following any long and complicated surgery.. (Tr4 116,
179.) A transfusion chill will shake the bed . (Tr. 116.)
One final reference to the testimony should be made.
Following the development of symptoms of kidney
failure in Mrs. Joseph) tests were c_onducted by the hasSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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pi tal to ascertain if possibly a mistake had been made in
the selection of the blood for the transfusion. It is uncontroverted that these re-tests affirmed the procedures
which had been originally used. No evidence of incom~
pacibility of blood could be demonstrated. Even the donors
themselves were recalled and tested and no claim is made
that the donors were not of the same blood type and Rh
factor as Mrs4 Joseph. (Tr. 23 6~259; Ex. D7; R25-R27.)
As to the pleadings it should be observed that appellants did not plead res ipsa loquitur nor did they at any
time during the trial indicate their reliance upon the doctrine until a request to instruct was made. ( Rl-44)

STATE:MENT OF POINTS

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TilE CASE ON THE
THEORY OF RES IPSA LOQUrnTR.

POINT II.
THE APPELLANTSt HA VINO. FAILED TO
PLEAD RES IPSA LOQUITURt 'WERE NOT ENTITLED TO AN INSTRucnoN ON THAT
THEORY.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGU_MENT
POINT It
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT THE CASE ON THE
THEORY OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR.
The appellants' principal ground of complaint is
based upon the refusal of the tr tal court to submit this case
to the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. The trial
court stated three reasons for refusing to instruct as ap~
pella n ts requested:
Because deaths do occur in blood transfus[on cases
without negligence.
1.

2.. Because the appellants did not plead res ipsa
loquitur, and
3. The appellants relied upon and attempted to
prove specific negligence. ( Tr. 271-2 72.)
The complaint alleged that the hospital was negligent
in administering incompatible blood to Mrs. Joseph and
that the hospital was further negligent because it failed to
terminate the transfusion when its servants knew or should
have known that the blood being transfused was causing
.a reaction.

As we have already pointed out the case was .submitted to the jury to determine if there was negligenc:e in
not stopping the transfusion. The jury found for the defendant on this issue and no complaint is made by appcllan ts of this finding.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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.& far as .the record. shows there is not one scintilla
of evidence which supports the contention that the hospital~ t~rough negligenc.e, administered incompatible blood
to the decedent.
·
On the contrary, the. record establishes without contradiction that, as far as medical science could determine
this blood was in fact compat1ble. The hospital produced
1ts entire record and disclosed all the facts which it knew
or could ascertain bearing upon this question. The appellants h.ad full and free access to this information and knew
the names of every witness whose testimony was available
to the respondent and who could shed any light upon
what occurred.

The final conclusion of the experts was unanimous
that the likely or probable cause of death of decedent was
some hidden, inherent or latent incompatibility of the
donors' blood which could not be demonstrated by any
test which could be applied to it. They all stated that
there are many causes of lower nephron nephrosis and
that incompatible blood is only one of them and it could
not be .stated. with absolute certainty that incompatible
blood was the cause of death in this case. They all further
agreed that death occurs from transfusion reactions which
cannot be explained because· the particular thing which
sometimes goes wrong when a donor,..s blood is mixed with
that of a patient· is unknown and cannot be discovered
by any known or recognized scientific test.
The .record js further clear .and uncontradicted that
.th~ tests used by the hospi.tal were correct, accepted and
recognized. There£ ore, the record lies in this posturethat in a certain percentage of cases, .transfusion reactions
.
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will happen and cannot be prevented no matter how careful the te-chnicians are in applying the tests which usually
reveal in compatibility.

Appellants on these facts would subject the defendant
hospital to an inference of negligence when the record
shows as a £act that this unfortunate accident was one
which the hospital 'v a.s helpless to prevent. This they seek
to justify on the specious argument that appellants were
not present when the blood was tested, where a possible
mixup might have occurred and because the tests were
made from pilot tubes and not from the actual bottle of
blood which was used. We have pointed out that the blood
in the transfusion bottle and in the pilot tubes was identical and that the procedures used rnake the possibility of
n1ixup conjectural and far~fetched in the extreme.

In short, the appellants fail to point to one single
fact upon which a charge of negligence of any kind could
be supported.

As respondent understands the rational of appellants"
argument, it is about as follows:
1. There are tests which wiU reveal incompatibility
factors in blood in the vast majority of cases~ but, it is
acknowledged, this is not always so. It is admitted that
in rare cases these tests fail for reasons w hie h cannot be

explained.

It is argued that res ipsa loquitur applies in those
cases where an injury does not ordinariiy result, based upon
past human experience, ~nd, _where the instrumentality
causing- injury is controlled by tjle defendant and not by
the pl~intiff, who himself does not a~t to_ bring injury u_pon
2.

hinisel£4
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Respondent believes that it is proper and very logical
to argue that the element of control essential to the application of res ipsa loquitur in a blood transfusion case is
lacking so that res ipsa loquitur cannot apply4 It is respectfully submitted that such control is lacking because
the hospital or technician using blood must of necessity
take it from a donor who manufactured it by his own
bodily functions and proce55es. The hospital thus takes
the blood as it finds it.. If it be also true, as the record
here disc loses without dispute, that testing is falli blc in
exceptional cases and the record further shows that all the
known and available means for determining compatibility
are used, as is the case here, and that, as far as could be determined by such tests~ the blood is compatible for a given
patient~ but, in spite of such testing an incompatibility
existed which was unknown and could not be ascertained,
then the element of exclusive control is lacking.
In addition, no one knows in this case where the hidden factor causing a react ion actually was, whether it was
some hidden factor in the donor"'s blood, or whether it was
a hidden factor present in 1\irs. Joseph~s blood. The hospital selected and furnished the blood of a donor but it
certainly had no control at all over the condition of the
patient. If the cause of the reactjon was due to the undeterminable condition of the patient ,s blood, then the element of control by the defendant was entirely lacking4
Until it is demonstrated by competent evidence where the
o bno:x.ious or incompatible factors origina ted:t either in
the donor or the patient, there is no room for the contention that the cause of injury was under the control of
rh e hospital. There is absolutely no such evidence in this
case. It is only in those cases where it can be shown beyond
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dispute that the agency causing injury or harm was in
fact under the control of the party charged with negligence that the doctrine can apply.

A blood transfusion case is not the same as one involving a manufactured or processed art1cle over which
the manufacturer or proces~or exercises absolute and complete control.
But even if these arguments are rejected the doctrine
still cannot apply here bee a use t! ansfusion reactions do
occur in the absence of neg]igence. True, they do not happen very often, but they occur in I/1 0 to 5/10 of 1% of
the cases. (Tr . 112~ 114; 115; 154-15 6; 165.) We submit
it is a non scqui tur to argue that be ca usc an occurrence is
rare or unexpected it is not ordinary.. Numerically it may
be rare but statistically it is as ordinary as death or taxes.
Statistically it has been established, as this record conclusive1y shows, that as inexorable as £ate itself these reactions will occur and nothing which man has yet devised
will prevent them from happening.
Based upon these facts we submit it would be grossly
unjust to subject a hospital or a doctor or a technic ian to
liability and an inference of negligence for something
which may not be preventable. The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur was not invented for the purpose of imposing
liability upon the innocent merely because a plaintiff is
unable to produce any evidence to prove his case.

In Dees vs. Pace, Calif. 257 Pac. 2d.

756~ a

doctor was
sued for malpractice in the performance of an hysterectomy.. In that case two doctors testified that they had
performed many hysterectomies without fistulas as an
aftermath of surgery. The plaintiff contended, as appel-
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lants do in this case, that because o £ this testimony res ipsa
loquitur was applicable. In rejecting thiS argument that
court said:

C'-The plaintiff contends that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this case in v-iew
of the testimony of Dr. Lamb and Dr. Shephard
that in the many hysterectomies performed by
them no fistulas had rcsul ted, and also in the testi-..
mony of Dr. Harrison and Dr. Shephard that the·
inc id en ce of fistulas in such c ase.s i:s .small. The
mere fact in itscl f that an unfavorable result is
somewhat rare does not give rise to such an inference4 The court refused to invoke the doctrine

in Farber v.L Olson, supra, and in Engelking vs ..
Carlson, supra, where the incidence is small.
)j

!he test is not whether the number of transfusion
reactions is rare or common, but rather, whether in the
ordinary course of events they inevitably will happen
without negligence.
Of course the record here, as appellants are compelled
to admit, supports the conclusion that they do so occur4

The conclusion of Dees vs. Pace:) supra~ is approved in
the case of Salgo vs. Leland Stanford University, Calif. 317
P. 2d. 170, w hete a case was reversed for error in the giv"ing of an instruction on res ipsa loquitur in a malpractic.e
case ·involving an aortography where that court said:

uThls brings us to the question of whether
·. there was· any professional evidence calling for the
application of the doctrinet Plain tiff's medical
witnesses do not testify on this subject, but all the
witnesses agree that paralysis is· a rare complication of a'?~ogr~phy. '"(his fact does not prove that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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it normally does not occur in the absence of negli-..
u
gence .....
That court also makes some very pertinent observations respecting the application of res ipsa loquitur in malpractice cases in the following language:
t~The

great difficulty in the application of the
doctrine (res ipsa loquitur) is to determine where
to draw the line . To apply it in all cases where an
unexpected result occurs would hamstring the de ..

veloprnent of medical science.. No medical man
would dare to use new procedures~ especially in
surgery; because if injury resulted he would be
prima facie guilty of negligence~ Medical science
has developed in leaps and strides in the past few
years.. Procedures that 40 years or even 1 0 years
ago, would have been considered impracticable and
fatal are now being successfully used; for example,
surgery upon the heart. Even the procedure used
in this case, translumbar aortography where the
aorta ~ punctured and a foreign substance injected
in order to determine the location of a suspected
block, is one which but a few years ago would not
have been attempted but one which is of great
value in determining whether or not corrective
surgery is needed and advisable. Thus a great responsibility rests upon the .. cour.ts-to determine
the point at w/Jich the doctrine will apply i-n .order

to be fair to a patietJf who has received

!l

result

which either common kncrwledge of laymen o-r of
medical men teaches ordinarily would not occur
without negligence, and to be fair to the medical
. men if there is a result which could occur uithaut
negligence and which should not impose uPon them
the presumption of negligence. "
It is. clear from this record that here we are dealing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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with a case, where, to para phrase the 1anguage of the
California Court, u.there is a result which could occur
without negligence and which should not impose upon
them (medical men) the presumption of negligence.~'
Similarly, in Wickoff vs. James, Calif. 324 P . 2d. 661,
it is held that the mere fact that a result is unexpected or
not anticipated is not enough to invoke the doctrine .

In Mitchell vs. Friedman) New Jersey 78, Atl. 2d. 417,
that court stated:
~'=The ordinary course

of events often in eludes

the unexpected; sometimes it presents, what) in
advance; would seem most unlikely to happen. ~ . /:.
See also Cun,ningham vs. Neil House Hotel Co., Ohio,
33 NE 2d. 859~ where the court said:

4!4!The mere occurrence of an unusual or unexplained accident~ if not su.ch as necessarily to
involve negligence does not warrant application
of the doctrine. ~!J
Appellants point to no Utah case where the doctrine
has been extended to the lengths contended for here and
we know of no such holding by this court.

On the other hand, this court in F&rest vs. Eason,
123 Utah 610, 261 P . 2d. 178, ~ays down the limits in
which a case may be given to a jury in a malpractice case.
-That case involved the alleged injection of. a. deleterious
sul?stance into plaintiff~s veins . It was co~tended that because there was testimony that the act of the defendant
could
have caused the injury
complained of the case should
.
.
have been submitted to th~ j~ry. This court said:
~~Giving .th~ case

to the jury under such cir~
cumstances with no shmuing that use of the subSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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stance was not in accordance with accepted
standards of professional skill, with no showing of
the manner of the injection, and with no showing
that any of the substances were deleterious allows
the jury to indulge in that type of speculat[on unpermitted by this or other courts generally~,~
The well accepted principle that res ipsa loquitur is
not applicable when it has been shown that the damage
claimed might be traced either to an act of negligence for
which the defendant would be chargeable or to an accident or other cause for which he could not be held is illustrated by the case of Moose-A-Bee Quarries vs. Eastern
Tractor & Equip-ment Co., Me., 29 Atl. 2d. 167~ Sec also
Tremelling vs~ So. Pac. Co., 70 Utah 72, 257 Pac~ 1066 .
In Marfiu- vs. S~ P. Co., 46 Fed. Supp. 957, the court
held that res ips a loquitur is not applicable in a case where
liability of the defendant rests upon surmise or conjecture..
None of the cases relied upon by appellants get to
the core of the question presented here. They all contain
merely the trite statement of the rule that res ipsa loquitur
is applicable if the injury is such that it would not have
happened in the ordinary course of events unless negli ...

gence is present.
These cases are inapplicable as authority for this case
because the evidence is that trans fusion reactions ·do occur
in the ordinary course of events even without negligence.

In Sher11UJ1't vs. Hartman, Calif~ 290 Pac. 2, 894,. there
was direct evidence that the defendant . .s nurses had failed
to check upon the transfusion until 200 cc. of blood had
leaked in to the tissues surrounding the vein. There was no
showing, such as in this caset that such leakage might occur
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in spite of anything which defendant could have done to
prevent it. The only evidence was that transfusion needles
often come unstuck.
In Seneris vs4 Haas, Calif. 291, Pac. 2, 915, there was
direct positive evidence by a competent expert that there
was .spinal cord damage which could have been caused by
inserting the needle into the wrong place in plaintiff.ts
spinal column. With such evidence the court concluded
it was proper to submit the c~sc on res ipsa loquitur even
though there was testimony that the paralysis could have
been caused without striking the· cord . The question which
the jury was allowed to determine was whether~ in fact~ defendant .struck the cord with the needle. There was no
claim that despite anything which defendant could have
done there was no way that striking of the cord could be
avoided in a certain percent age of cases. On the other
hand, the record in this ·case so conclusively proves the
risk of unavoidable reactions.

Milias vs, Wheeler Hospital, California 241, P. 2d.
68 4, merely held that under the evidence, it was proper
to submit res jpsa loquitur to the jury and let it decide
whether or not to apply the doctrine. There was both
evidence that the injury complained of could have been
the result of burns from the application of too hot a bot~
tle or compress~ or that possibly the .scarring of the plain--.
titf,s leg was due to her condition, which wou1d not
tolerate the application of sufficient heat to obtain a bene£cial result and save her life, which condition, of course,
was not the fault of the defendant. In none of these cases
was there any evidence such as in this case that the result
sometimes occurs without negligence and is inev-itable4 In
all these cases cited by appellant there was some evidence
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upon which a claim of negligence could be based4 Not so
here. Here, as we have pointed out, there is no evidence
of any negligent act on the part of respondent and the
record shows without dispute that tr ansf us ion reactions
are unavoidable even with the exercise of the._ utmost degree of care and skill.. Finally there is no evidence pointing
to any mishap or mixup of the blood. The verification
of the original resting by exhaustive rechecks complete Iy
rules out this speculative hypo thesis~
Respondent takes exception to the citation of the
quotations from Vol. 20 of the Am. Journal of Medical
Technology and from Vol. 151 of the Journal of the
American Medical Association as inadmissible hearsay and
not a part of the record in this case and therefore improper.
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POINT II.
THE APPELLANTS, HAVING FAILED TO
PLEAD RES IPSA LOQUITUR~ WERE NOT ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION ON THAI
THEORY.
Appellants have correctly stated the reasons given
by the trial court in refusing to submit an instruction on
res ipsa loquitur to the jury. The principal reason was
that there was positive competent evidence in the record
that transfusion reactions occur when no negligence can
be demonstrated. This has been fully discussed under
Point It The second ground of refusal to so instruct was
that res ipsa loquitur was not pleaded. That this is so
is manifest from the complaint itself. (R. 1-4.) This is
the Iaw in this jurisdiction.

In Loos vs . Mt. Fuel Supply, 99 Utah 4961 108 P. 2d.
2 54, this cour tt speaking thru !\h. Justice Wolfe, said~
nln some cases where 8pecifi.c acts of negligence are alleged in the complaint the specific
allegations of violations of duty can be ignored
and the pleadings .still .show a cause of action based
on res ipsa loquitur. . • . Nevertheless we think one
who wishes to rely on that doctrine,. as well as
specifically assigned . acts of negligence, must so
plead, either by a separate court (count) or by
proper allegation to the effect that the negligence to
be inferred from the general situation caused the
injury thereby notifying the other party that he
intends to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
To set out by way of inducement a situation which
itself may bespeak a prima facie case of negligence
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gence and allege that by ~~reason of such negligent
acts and omissions on the part of the defendant
(respondent) (referring to those specific ally alleged) the plaintiff was injured/"' etc., docs not
su:ffici ently put the defendant on notic c that the
plaintiff is going to rely on the situation itself to
furnish any infe renee of negligence.,,
We submit therefore that the trial court was correct
on at least two of the stated reasons for refusing appellants_, request to instruct~ and therefore the verdict of
the jury and the judgement entered thereon must be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted}
RAY~

QUINNEY & NEBEKER and
ALBERT R. BOWEN
Attorneys for
Defendant and Respondent.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

